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Abstract. When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in
the Stable Marriage problem, stable matchings can have different sizes.
The problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in this
context is known to be NP-hard, even under very severe restrictions
on the number, size and position of ties. In this paper, we describe a
polynomial-time 8
5
-approximation algorithm for a variant in which ties
are on one side only and at the end of the preference lists. The particular
variant is motivated by important applications in large scale centralized
matching schemes.
1 Introduction
Background
An instance of the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete Lists
(SMTI) comprises a set of n1 men m1, . . . , mn1 and a set of n2 women w1, . . . , wn2 .
Each person has a preference list consisting of a subset of the members of the
opposite sex, his or her acceptable partners, listed in order of preference, with
ties, consisting of two or more persons of equal preference, permitted. If man
m and woman w appear on each other’s preference list then (m, w) is called
an acceptable pair. If w precedes w′ on m’s list then m is said to prefer w to
w′, while if w and w′ appear together in a tie on m’s list then m is said to be
indifferent between w and w′.
A matching is a set M of acceptable pairs so that each person appears in at
most one pair of M . If M is a matching and (m, w) ∈ M we write w = M(m)
and m = M(w), and we say that m and w are partners in M . A pair (m, w) is a
blocking pair for M , or blocks M , if m is either unmatched in M or prefers w to
M(m), and simultaneously w is either unmatched in M or prefers m to M(w).
A matching for which there is no blocking pair is said to be stable.
SMTI is an extension of the classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) intro-
duced by Gale and Shapley [2]. In the classical case, the numbers of men and
women are equal, all preference lists are complete, i.e., they contain all members
of the opposite sex, and ties are not permitted, i.e., all preferences are strict.
Gale and Shapley proved that, for every instance of SM, there is at least one
? Supported by EPSRC research grant EP/E011993/1.
stable matching, and they described an O(n2) time algorithm to find such a
matching; this has come to be known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
This algorithm is easily extended to the case in which the numbers of men and
women differ and preference lists are incomplete (SMI – Stable Marriage with
Incomplete lists); it has complexity O(a) in this case, where a is the number of
acceptable pairs [4]. In the case of SMI, not everyone need be matched in a stable
matching. In general, for a given instance of SMI, there may be many stable
matchings – exponentially many in extreme cases – but all stable matchings
have the same size and match exactly the same sets of men and women [15, 3].
The Gale-Shapley algorithm may be applied from either the men’s side or the
women’s side, and in general these two applications will produce different stable
matchings. When applied from the men’s side, the man-optimal stable matching
is found; in this, every man has the best partner that he can have in any stable
matching, and every woman the worst. When the algorithm is applied from
the women’s side, the woman-optimal stable matching results, with analogous
properties. Exceptionally, the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings
may coincide, in which case this is the unique stable matching, but in general
there may be other stable matchings – possibly exponentially many – between
these two extremes. However, for a given instance of SMI, all stable matchings
have the same size and match exactly the same sets of men and women [15, 3].
The situation for SMTI is dramatically different. Again, at least one stable
matching exists for every instance, and can be found in O(a) time by breaking
all ties in an arbitrary way to give an instance of SMI, and applying the Gale-
Shapley algorithm to that instance. However, the ways in which ties are broken
can significantly affect the outcome. In particular, not all stable matchings need
be of the same size, and in the most extreme case, there may be two stable
matchings M and M ′ with |M | = 2|M ′|. Furthermore, the problem of finding
a stable matching of maximum cardinality for an instance of SMTI – problem
MAX-SMTI – is NP-hard [13]. This hardness result holds even under severe
restrictions, for example, if the ties are on one side only, each list contains at
most one tie, and that tie, if present, is at the end of the list.
Practical applications
The practical importance of stable matching problems arises from their ap-
plication in the assignment of applicants to positions in various job markets.
The many-one version of the problem has come to be known as the Hospi-
tals/Residents problem (HR) because of its widespread application in the medi-
cal employment domain [15, 9, 14, 1, 16]. In an instance of HR, each resident has
a preference list of acceptable hospitals, while each hospital has a preference list
of acceptable residents together with a quota of positions. A matching M is a
set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs such that each resident is in at most one
pair, and each hospital is in a number of pairs that is bounded by its quota. If
pair (r, h) is in M , we write h = M(r) and r ∈ M(h), so that M(h) is a set of
residents for each hospital h. A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair,
i.e., an acceptable pair (r, h) such that r is either unmatched in M or prefers h
Men’s preferences Women’s preferences
m1 : w1 w2 w1 : ( m1 m2 )
m2 : w1 w2 : m1
Fig. 1. An instance of SSMTI with stable matchings of sizes 1 and 2.
to M(r), and simultaneously h is either under quota or prefers r to at least one
member of M(h).
As in the case of SMI, all stable matchings for an instance of HR have the
same size, and so-called resident-optimal and hospital-optimal stable matchings
can be found by applying an extended version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm
from the residents’ side or the hospitals’ side respectively. But if ties are allowed
in the preference lists - the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) – then
as in the case of SMTI, stable matchings can have different sizes, and it is NP-
hard to find a stable matching of maximum size, even under severe restrictions
on the number, size, and position of ties.
Variants of the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm are routinely used in a
number of countries, including the United States [14], Canada [1] and Scotland
[16], to allocate graduating medical students to hospital posts, and in a variety
of other countries and contexts. In large scale matching schemes of this kind,
participants, particularly large popular hospitals, may not be able to provide
a genuine strict preference order over what may be a very large number of
applicants, so that HRT is a more appropriate model than HR. If artificial tie-
breaking is carried out, either by the participant, because a strictly ordered list is
required by the matching scheme, or by the administrators of the scheme, prior
to running an algorithm that requires strict preferences, then the size of the
resulting stable matching is likely to be affected. Breaking ties in different ways
will typically yield stable matchings of different sizes; what would be ideal would
be to find a way of breaking the ties that maximizes the size of the resulting
stable matching, but the NP-hardness of this problem makes this an objective
that is unlikely to be feasible.
A special case of HRT arises if residents are required to strictly rank their
chosen hospitals but hospitals are asked to rank only as many of their applicants
as they reasonably can, and then place the remainder in a single tie at the end.
For example this variant has been employed in the Scottish Foundation Alloca-
tion Scheme (SFAS). The correspondingly restricted version of SMTI, where all
men’s lists are strict and women’s lists may contain one tie at the end, is the spe-
cial case in which all quotas are equal to one. We refer to these restricted versions
of SMTI and HRT as Special SMTI/HRT (SSMTI/SHRT), and use the terms
MAX-SSMTI and MAX-SHRT for the problems of finding maximum cardinality
stable matchings in these cases, which remain NP-hard problems [13].
Figure 1 shows an example of SSMTI in which there are two stable matchings,
M1 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)} of size 2 and M2 = {(m1, w1)} of size 1. A tie in the
preference lists is indicated by parentheses.
Related results
It is trivial to establish that there can be at most a factor of two difference
between the sizes of a minimum and maximum cardinality stable matching for
an instance of SMTI, and as a consequence, breaking ties arbitrarily and applying
the Gale-Shapley algorithm gives a 2-approximation algorithm for MAX-SMTI.
A number of improved approximation algorithms for versions of SMTI have
recently been proposed.
For the general case, Iwama et al [11] gave an algorithm with a performance
guarantee of (2 − c/√n), (for the case of n men and n women), for a constant
c. Very recently, Iwama et al [12] gave the first approximation algorithm for the
general case with a constant performance guarantee better than 2, namely 15
8
.
From the inapproximability point of view, Halldo´rsson et al showed the problem
to be APX-complete [5], and gave a lower bound of 21
19
on any polynomial-time
approximation algorithm (assuming P 6= NP ) [6]. This lower bound applies even
to MAX-SSMTI.
As far as special cases are concerned, Halldo´rsson et al [6] gave a (2/(1 +
L−2))-approximation algorithm for the case where all ties are on one side, and
are of length at most L – so, for example, this gives a bound of 8
5
when all ties
are of length 2. If ties are on both sides and restricted to be of length 2, a bound
of 13
7
is shown in [6]. Halldo´rsson et al [7] also described a randomized algorithm
with an expected performance guarantee of 10
7
for the same special case under
the additional restriction that there is at most one tie per list.
The contribution of this paper
In this paper, we focus on the problem MAX-SSMTI described above, and give
a polynomial-time 8
5
-approximation algorithm for this case. The algorithm is
relatively easy to extend to MAX-HRT, and the same 8
5
performance guarantee
holds in this more general setting. We also show that this performance guarantee
is the best that can be proved for the algorithm by providing an example for
which this bound is realised.
2 The algorithm
In what follows, we assume that each man’s preference list is strict, and each
woman’s preference list is strict except for a tie (of length ≥ 1) at the end. The
algorithm consists of three phases. The first phase is a variant of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm for the classical stable marriage problem, applied from the women’s
side, but with women proposing only as far as the tie (if any) in their list. This
results in a provisional matching involving precisely those men who received
proposals. The second phase adds to this provisional matching a maximal set of
acceptable pairs from among the remaining men and women. Finally, in Phase
3 all ties are broken, favouring unmatched men over matched men, and the
standard Gale-Shapley algorithm is run to completion on the resulting instance
of SMI.
assign each person to be free;
while (some woman w is free) and (w has a non-empty list)
and (w has an untied man m at the head of her list) {
w proposes, and becomes engaged to m;
for each successor w′ of w on m’s list {
if w′ is engaged to m
break the engagement, so that w′ becomes free;
delete the pair (m, w′) from the preference lists;
}
}
Fig. 2. Phase 1 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX
Phase 1 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX
The first phase of the algorithm is a variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for
the classical stable marriage problem, applied from the women’s side. During
this phase, zero or more deletions are made from the preference lists – by the
deletion of the pair (m, w), we mean the removal of w from m’s list and the
removal of m from that of w. Initially, everyone is free. During execution of the
algorithm, a woman may alternate between being free and being engaged, but
once a man becomes engaged, he remains in that state, though the identity of his
partner may change over time. A free woman w who still has an untied man on
her current list proposes to the first such man and becomes (at least temporarily)
engaged to that man. When a man m receives a proposal from woman w, he
rejects his current partner (if any), setting her free, and all pairs (m, w′) such
that m prefers w to w′ are deleted. This phase of the algorithm is summarised
in Figure 2.
When Phase 1 of the algorithm terminates on a given instance I , a woman
w’s preference list must be in one of three possible states – it may be empty, it
may consist of a single tie, or it may have a unique untied man m at its head.
In the latter case, it is clear that m cannot be the unique man at the head of
any other woman’s list, and that w is the last entry in m’s list.
Lemma 1. On termination of Phase 1 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX,
(i) no deleted pair can belong to a stable matching;
(ii) if man m is the unique man at the head of some woman’s list then m is
matched in every stable matching.
Proof. (i) Suppose that (m, w) is a deleted pair that belongs to a stable matching
M , and that (m, w) was the first such pair to be deleted in an execution of Phase
1 of the algorithm. This must have happened because m received a proposal from
some woman w′ whom he prefers to w. Woman w′ is either unmatched in M or
prefers m to M(w), because any pair (m′, w′) such that w′ prefers m′ to m must
have been previously deleted, and by our assumption, this pair cannot be in a
stable matching. Hence (m, w′) blocks M , a contradiction.
V = Y1 ∪Q1;
E = {(m, w) ∈ Y1 ×Q1 : (m,w) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair};
construct the bipartite graph G = (V, E);
K = a maximum cardinality matching in G;
for each pair (m,w) ∈ K
promote m from the tie to the head of w’s list;
re-activate the proposal sequence of Phase 1;
Fig. 3. Phase 2 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX
(ii) Suppose that m is the unique man at the head of woman w’s list, and that
M is a stable matching in which m is unmatched. Then, by part (i), w is either
unmatched in M or prefers m to M(w), so that (m, w) blocks M , a contradiction.
ut
We refer to the men who appear untied at the head of some woman’s list
after Phase 1 of the algorithm as the Phase 1 X-men and the other men as the
Phase 1 Y-men, and we denote these sets by X1 and Y1 respectively. Likewise,
the women who have an untied man at the head of their list are the Phase 1
P-women and the others are the Phase 1 Q-women, denoted by P1 and Q1. So
the engaged pairs at the end of Phase 1 constitute a perfect matching between
X1 and P1, and the essence of Lemma 1(ii) is that each member of X1 is matched
in every stable matching. We call the preference lists that remain after Phase 1
the Phase 1 lists, and if man m and woman w are in each other’s Phase 1 lists,
we say that (m, w) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair.
Phase 2 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX
In Phase 2 of the algorithm, we seek to increase the number of men who are
guaranteed to be matched. To this end, we find a maximum cardinality matching
K of Y1 to Q1, where a pair (m, w) can be in this matching only if m ∈ Y1,
w ∈ Q1, and (m, w) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair. For each pair (m, w) in K, we
break the tie in w’s Phase-1 list by promoting m to the head of that list (and
leaving the rest of the tie intact). We then re-activate the proposal sequence of
Phase 1, which will lead to a single proposal corresponding to each pair in K,
and which may result in some further deletions from the preference lists, but no
rejections and no other proposals. This produces an instance I ′ of SSMTI that
is a refinement of the original instance I – or more properly, a refinement of the
variant of I that results from application of Phase 1; clearly any matching that
is stable for I ′ is also stable for I , but not necessarily vice-versa. Phase 2 of the
algorithm is summarised in Figure 3.
Lemma 2. Every man who is untied at the head of some woman’s list on ter-
mination of Phase 2 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX is matched in every stable
matching for I ′.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 1(ii). ut
Note that, while Lemma 2 can be expected, in many cases, to give a stronger
lower bound on the size of a stable matching than is given by Lemma 1, this
need not be the case. It is perfectly possible that the Phase 1 Q-women have
only Phase 1 X-men in their preference lists, and that, as a consequence, K is
the empty matching. However, we now extend the set of X-men and P -women to
include those who became engaged during Phase 2. Henceforth, we use the term
X-men to refer to those men who appear untied at the head of some woman’s list,
and the P-women are the women who have an X-man at the head of their list,
after Phase 2 of the algorithm. Let x be the number of X-men and P -women,
and suppose that these sets are X = {m1, . . . , mx} and P = {w1, . . . , wx} re-
spectively. We also define Y = {mx+1, . . . , mn1} and Q = {wx+1, . . . , wn2}, and
refer to these sets as the Y-men and Q-women respectively.
Lemma 3. Let A be a matching that is stable for I ′, and let M be a maximum
cardinality stable matching for I. Then
(i) A Y -man who is matched in M must be matched in M with a P -woman.
(ii) |M | ≤ |A|+ x;
(iii) |M | ≤ 2x.
Proof. (i) Suppose that m is a Y -man and that (m, w) ∈ M . Then if w were a
Q-woman, she must be a Phase 1 Q-woman who failed to be matched during
Phase 2, and therefore the matching found in Phase 2 could have been extended
by adding the pair (m, w), contradicting its maximality.
(ii) By Lemma 2, all of the X-men are matched in A. So the only men who can
be matched in M but not in A are Y -men. By (i), such a man must be matched
in M with a P -woman. The inequality follows, as there are just x P -women.
(iii) Men matched in M are either X-men, and there are x of these, or Y -men
matched with P -women (by (i)), and there are x of the latter, hence at most 2x
such men in total. ut
Phase 3 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX
Phase 3 of the algorithm involves completely breaking the remaining ties and
then applying to the resulting instance of SMI the standard Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm (or at least the extended version of that algorithm that deletes redundant
entries from the preference lists - see [4]). The algorithm may be applied from
either the men’s or women’s side; as is well known, the size of the resulting
matching will be the same in each case. Tie-breaking is carried out according
to just one restriction, namely, for each tie, the Y -men are given priority over
the X-men. In other words, each tie is resolved by listing the Y -men that it
contains, in arbitrary order, followed by the X-men that it contains, again in
arbitrary order. It is immediate that the algorithm produces a matching that is
stable for the original instance of SMTI. For an instance I of SMTI, we denote
by I ′′ an instance of SMI obtained by application of Phases 1 and 2 of Algo-
rithm SSMTI-APPROX, followed by tie-breaking according to this rule. Again
it is immediate that a matching that is stable for I ′′ is also stable for I . Phase
3 of the algorithm is summarised in Figure 4.
for each woman w
break the tie (if any) in w’s list, placing the Y -men ahead of the X-men;
/* Now apply the standard Gale-Shapley algorithm */
assign each person to be free;
while (some man m is free) and (m has a non-empty list) {
w = the first woman on m’s list;
m proposes, and becomes engaged to w;
for each successor m′ of m on w’s list {
if m′ is engaged to w
break the engagement, so that m′ becomes free;
delete the pair (m′, w) from the preference lists;
}
}
return the set A of engaged pairs;
Fig. 4. Phase 3 of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX
The performance guarantee
Let A be a matching produced by application of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX,
and let M be a maximum cardinality stable matching for the original instance
I of SSMTI. As previously established, all of the X-men are matched in A.
Suppose that exactly r of the Y -men, say mx+1, . . . , mx+r, are matched in M
but not in A. Let us call these men the extra men (for M), and their partners
in M the extra women.
Lemma 4. (i) Each extra woman is matched in A.
(ii) An extra woman is either matched in A to a Y -man or strictly prefers her
A-partner to her M -partner.
Proof. Let w be an extra woman, and let m be her partner in M . Recall that
M is stable for the original instance I , while A is stable for the refined instance
I ′′ (of SMI), and therefore also for the instances I ′ and I (of SSMTI).
(i) By definition, m is an extra man and therefore is not matched in A, so that
if w is not matched in A it is immediate that the pair (m, w) blocks A.
(ii) Let a be w’s A-partner. If w strictly prefers m to a then, since m is unmatched
in A, the pair (m, w) blocks A in I , a contradiction. If m and a are tied in w’s
list, and a is an X-man then, when that tie was broken to form I ′′, m, being a
Y -man, must have preceded a in the resulting strict preference list. Hence, again
since m is unmatched in A, the pair (m, w) blocks A in I ′′, a contradiction. ut
We partition M ’s extra men into two sets U and V ; those in U have an M -
partner who is matched in A to an X-man, and those in V have an M -partner
who is matched in A to a Y -man. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
U = {mx+1, . . . , mx+s} and V = {mx+s+1, . . . , mx+r}, i.e., |U | = s, |V | = r− s.
Let M(U) denote the set of women who are matched in M to a man in U .
Suppose that, among the men who are matched in A with women in M(U),
exactly t (≤ s) are unmatched in M . (These are all X-men, by definition of U ,
but some X-men – those who became so during Phase 2 of the algorithm, need
not be matched in M .)
Our next lemma gives us certain inequalities involving the sizes of matchings
M and A that will enable us to establish the claimed performance guarantee for
Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX.
Lemma 5. (i) |M | ≤ |A|+ r − t.
(ii) |A| ≥ x + r − s.
(iii) |A| ≥ r + s− t.
Proof. (i) All the X-men are matched in A, but at least t of them are not
matched in M , and the Y -men who are matched in M but not in A number
exactly r.
(ii) Consider the set V . Each woman w who is the partner in M of a man in V
is matched in A to a Y -man, and there are r − s such women w. This gives us
r− s of the Y -men who are matched in A, and together with all x of the X-men
who, by Lemma 1(ii), are all matched in A, we have a total of x + r− s distinct
men who are matched in A.
(iii) Consider the set U , and suppose that (mx+j , wij ) is in M for j = 1, . . . , s.
By definition of U , each wij has an X-man as her partner in A; without loss
of generality, suppose that (mj , wij ) is in A, for j = 1, . . . , s. By Lemma 4, wij
strictly prefers her A-partner mj to her M -partner mx+j . Each mj is an X-man
and s− t is the number of these men who are matched in M ; suppose, without
loss of generality, that (mj , wkj ) is in M , for j = 1, . . . , s− t. Then none of these
wkj can be an extra woman, for the M -partners of the latter are Y -men. Also,
each of the men mj prefers wkj to wij , for otherwise (mj , wij ) would block M .
Furthermore, each wkj must be matched in A. For if not, the pair (mj , wkj )
would block A. It follows that we have a total of r + s− t women who must be
matched in A, namely the r extra women, by Lemma 4, and the s − t women
wk1 , . . . , wks−t . ut
We are now in a position to establish our main theorem.
Theorem 1. For a given instance of SSMTI, let M be a maximum cardinality
stable matching and let A be a stable matching returned by Algorithm SSMTI-
APPROX. Then |M | ≤ 8|A|/5.
Proof. By Lemma 5 we have |A| ≥ max(x + r − s, r + s− t) ≥ 1
2
((x + r − s) +
(r + s− t)) = x/2 + r− t/2. So, by Lemma 3(iii), |A| ≥ |M |/4 + r− t/2. Hence,
by Lemma 5(i), |A| ≥ |M |/4 + |M | − |A|+ t− t/2, and so 2|A| ≥ 5|M |/4 + t/2,
from which the claimed bound follows. ut
Complexity of the algorithm
The worst-case complexity of Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX is dominated by the
maximum cardinality matching step in Phase 2. Using the Hopcroft-Karp algo-
rithm [8], this can be achieved in O(
√
na) time, where n is the total number of
men and women, and a is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists. However,
there is a variant of the algorithm that achieves the same performance guaran-
tee but with O(a) complexity. This is obtained by observing that, in Phase 2, it
suffices to find a maximal matching – i.e., a matching that cannot be extended
to a larger matching by adding further pairs – rather than a maximum cardinal-
ity matching, of men in Y1 to women in Q1. The only place in the subsequent
argument where the relevant property of this matching is needed is in the proof
of Lemma 3(i), and it is indeed merely maximality that is required. A maximal
matching can be found in O(a) time, and all other parts of the algorithm are
merely variants of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. It is not hard to show that these
can also be implemented to run in O(a) time (see [4]).
Tightness of the approximation guarantee
This is the tightest bound that can be established for Algorithm SSMTI-APPROX.
Figure 5 shows an example where the ratio of |M | to |A| is 8
5
. The matching M =
{(m1, w5), (m2, w6), (m3, w7), (m4, w8), (m5, w1), (m6, w2), (m7, w3), (m8, w4)} is
a maximum cardinality stable matching of size 8, whereas if ties are broken sim-
ply by removing the parentheses, the algorithm returns matching A = {(m1, w2),
(m2, w3), (m3, w5), (m4, w6), (m8, w1)}, of size 5. By duplicating this pattern, we
can obtain arbitrarily large instances realising the 8
5
ratio.
Men’s preferences Women’s preferences
m1 : w5 w2 w1 : m3 ( m8 m5 )
m2 : w6 w3 w2 : m1 m6
m3 : w5 w7 w8 w1 w3 : m2 m7
m4 : w6 w8 w7 w4 w4 : m4 m8
m5 : w1 w5 : ( m3 m1 )
m6 : w2 w6 : ( m4 m2 )
m7 : w3 w7 : ( m4 m3 )
m8 : w1 w4 w8 : ( m3 m4 )
Fig. 5. An instance of SSMTI with ratio 8
5
Extension to Special HRT
In view of the fact that our study was motivated by practical applications of the
HRT problem, it is important to note that we can obtain exactly the same 8
5
performance guarantee for an analogous algorithm for the special case of HRT
in which each hospital’s preference list has a tie of length ≥ 1 at the end. Full
details of the extended algorithm and a correctness proof can be found in [10].
3 Summary and Open Problems
We have described a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with a perfor-
mance guarantee of 8
5
for a maximum cardinality stable matching in NP-hard
variants of the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residents problems that are of sig-
nificant practical interest. We have also shown that this performance guarantee
is the best that can be proved for the algorithm.
The most obvious open question to pursue is whether this or a similar ap-
proach can yield useful performance guarantees for more general versions of
SMTI and HRT, for example when there can be a single tie at the end of the
lists on both sides, or when the lists on one side can contain arbitrary ties.
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